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The traditional approach to the study of human factors in the maritime field involves the analysis of 
accidents without considering human factors reliability analysis. The main approach being use to 
analyze human errors are statistical approach and probability theory approach. Another suitable 
approach to the study of human factors in the maritime industry is the quasi-experimental field study 
where variations in performance (for example attention) can be observed as a function of natural 
variations in performance shaping factors. This paper analyzes result of modeling human error and 
human reliability emanating from the use of technology on board ship navigation in coastal water area 
by using qualitative and quantitative tools. Accident reports from marine department are used as 
empirical material for quantitative analysis. The literature on safety is based on common themes of 
accidents, the influence of human error resulting from technology usage design, accident report from 
MAIB and interventions information are use for qualitative assessment. Human reliability assessment 
involves analysis of accident in waterways, emanating from human-technology factors interface. This 
paper report an enhancement requirement of the methodological issues with previous research study, 
monitoring and deduce recommendations for technology modification of the human factors necessary 
to improve maritime safety performance. The result presented can contribute to rule making, and safety 
management leading for development of guideline and standards for human reliability risk management 
for ship navigating within inland and coastal waters.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans have relied on oceans, lakes, and rivers to ship 
goods from one end to another throughout the recorded 
history. Today, over 90% of the world’s cargo is 
transported by merchant ships due to various reasons; 
including the fact that it is the cheapest form of 
transportation. The shipping industry has a fairly good 
safety record, however, maritime accidents have a high 
potential   for  catastrophes.  Past  experiences  research  
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report indicate that in the shipping industry around 80% 
of all accidents are rooted in human error (Fortland, 
1996). Safety has been an immense public concern, 
especially caused in operations risk like: nuclear power 
generation, nuclear weapons, aviation, chemical/ petro-
leum processing and marine transportation (Robb et al., 
1996). 
There are several basic aspects of maritime activity 
that make it unique. Ships are complex, confined and 
isolated systems. They are sufficient on energy supply, 
they have a limited manpower and resources, and they 
have a limited response capacity to face emergencies. 
These particular  characteristics  made  maritime  trade  a  
 
 
 
 
risky activity, where a fault in navigation or in usual port 
operations can leads to injuries or lost of life, to damage 
of property and sometimes irreparable damage to 
maritime environment (de la Campa Portela, 2005). 
The main purpose of navigation is a safe and efficient 
sailing of the ship between diverse points which require 
steering the ship movement on a planned trajectory. The 
accident occurrence of factors affecting the ship’s 
movement causes its limitation. The ship’s sailing should 
be safe, so that it does not cause navigation accident. A 
navigational accident is an unwanted occurrence which 
can cause loss of life or health, loss or damage to ship or 
cargo, the pollution of natural environment, damage to 
the hydro-technological structure, and economical loss 
due to delay in the port  and associated activities. 
This paper presents the result of application of 
quantitative and empirical approach to analyze human 
factors for reliability assessment of ship navigating in 
coastal water. The approach is based upon a theoretical 
framework of well-known models. It is possible to benefit 
from the causal connection between human errors and 
accidents. It is possible to get a fast and easy access to 
empirical material from historical data that are analyzed, 
compared to field studies or laboratory studies. The use 
of modest approach to standardized developments 
process through qualitative and quantitative risk 
assessment and analysis methods is necessary for 
human reliability analysis (HRA) to perform. Quantitative 
risk assessment and analysis for HRA are best analyzed 
using failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault 
tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA). 
Computer Relex reliability software is use for quantitative 
risk. While for the qualitative risk assessment and 
analysis method, some checklists and safety or review 
audits is emphasized.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Human factors deal with human abilities and limitations in 
relation to the design of systems, organizations, tools etc. 
Important parameters are safety, efficiency and comfort. 
Human errors and human factors are often studied 
separately; therefore, the relationship between them is 
often overlooked. According to Gordon et al. (1998), 
proposes a framework for describing the relationships 
between underlying human factors and more immediately 
evident human errors. Gordon categorizes human factors 
as individual, group, or organizational, following the 
Rasmussen model “Perceptions on the concept of human 
error,” that categorize human errors as skills-based, rule-
based, or knowledge-based.   
System-induced errors reflect deficiencies in the way 
the total system is designed. They include mistakes in 
designating the numbers and types of personnel, in 
training, in data resources, in logistics and in mainte-
nance requirements and support.  Design-induced  errors  
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result from inadequacies in the design of individual items 
of equipment. The new equipment characteristics create 
special difficulties for the operator which substantially 
increases the potential for error. Operator-induced errors 
can be traced directly to an incompetency on the part of 
the individual who makes that error. They include errors 
resulting from lack of capability, training, skill, motivation, 
or from fatigue. 
Several studies and case reviews have found that 
organizational factors may be the most critical in consi-
dering human factors contributions to marine accidents. 
At the organizational level, various factors may contribute 
to an increase in incidents and accidents, including cost-
cutting programs and the level of communication 
between work-sites (Gordon, 1998).  
According to the US Coast Guard’s (USCG) risk-based 
decision-making guidelines categorize human error into 
four categories, which form a matrix: intentional errors, 
unintentional errors, errors of omission and errors of 
commission. An unintentional error is an act committed or 
omitted accidentally, with no prior thought; therefore, 
intentional errors have also been referred to as "routine 
violations”. An error of omission occurs when an operator 
fails to perform a step or task. An error of commission 
occurs when an operator performs a step or task 
incorrectly (USCG, 2006). Maritime transportation is a 
complex socio-technical system formed by four interde-
pendent factors as technology, environment, people and 
organizational structures. Each of these dimensions has 
direct or indirect effects on maritime casualties, but 
failures of human action and judgment have often been 
seen as an important part of the causes. Main cause of 
growing number of accidents has been attributed 
specifically to "human error".  
Nivolianitou et al. (2006) pointed out those technical 
factors that are more readily resolved than human factors 
through technological and regulatory “fixes” leaving 
human-related errors and breakdowns as the most 
probable cause of industrial accidents (Hee et al., 1999). 
Supporting this theory, noting structural or technological 
failures are generally responsible for less than 20% of 
accidents involving complex systems, and noting this is 
“a tribute to technology”. 
By comparison, more than 80% of accidents can be 
attributed to the “unanticipated actions of people” leading 
to undesirable outcomes. Hee et al. (1999) concluded 
that human inputs to technolo-gical and engineering 
processes may actually contribute to accident risks from 
the beginning stages of equipment design. 
There are many methods and techniques that have 
been developed to perform various types of analysis, in 
areas such as reliability and safety. Several different 
accident forecasting models and analytical tools have 
been developed in an attempt to identify root cause 
errors in human systems and develop preventive mea-
sures that intervene at the appropriate level, although the 
proper categorization of human and organizational  errors  
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is critical to this process (Nivolianitou et al., 2006). 
Quantitative analysis relies on statistical methods and 
databases that identify the probability and consequence. 
This objective approach examines the system in greater 
detail for risk (Robb et al., 1996). 
Quantitative risk analysis generally provides a more 
uniform understanding among different individuals, but 
requires quality data for accurate results. Qualitative risk 
analysis uses expert opinion to evaluate the probability 
and consequence. This subjective approach may be 
sufficient to assess the risk of a marine system (Robb et 
al., 1996). 
The qualitative method for risk assessment or analysis 
is designed for the purpose of enhancing one’s 
awareness of potential problems and can assist one in 
analyzing these risks. A combination of both qualitative 
and quantitative risk analysis can be used depending on 
the situation.  
FMEA is another powerful tool used by system safety 
and reliability engineers/analysts to identify critical parts, 
functions and components whose failure will lead to 
undesirable outcomes such as production loss, injury or 
even an accident.  
The tool was first proposed by National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) in year 1963 for their 
obvious reliability requirements. Since then, it has been 
extensively used as a powerful technique for system 
safety and reliability analysis of products and processes 
in wide range of industries - particularly aerospace, 
nuclear, automotive and medical.  
The concept of fault tree analysis was originated by 
Bell Telephone Laboratories as a technique to perform a 
safety evaluation of the minuteman launch control 
system. Bell engineers discovered that the method used 
to describe the flow of “correct” logic in data processing 
equipment could also be used for analyzing the “false” 
logic which results from component failures. A FTA is 
useful for understanding the mode of occurrence of an 
accident logically. Furthermore, given the failure proba-
bilities of system components, the occurrence probability 
of the top event (TE) can be obtained. Traditionally, it is 
usually assumed that the basic events within a fault tree 
are independent of each other and could be represented 
in terms of probabilistic numbers. With this assumption, 
quantitative analyses of fault trees are usually performed 
by considering two cases: (1) fault trees without repeated 
event, and (2) fault trees with repeated events. 
Event tree analysis is a binary form of a decision tree 
for evaluating the various multiple decision paths in a 
given problem. ETA appears to have been developed 
during the WASH-1400 nuclear power plant safety study. 
The WASH-1400 team realized that a nuclear power 
plant PRA could be achieved by FTA; however, the 
resulting fault trees (FTs) would be very large and 
cumbersome, and they therefore established ETA to 
condense the analysis into a more manageable picture, 
while still utilizing FTA. 
 
 
 
 
Human error and accident in waterways 
 
The 21st century shipping industry faces new challenges 
in term of accident and its consequence. For instance, 25 
years ago the average cargo ship would have been 
manned with a crew of between 40 and 50 (Grech et al., 
2002). Today technological advances have contributed to 
decrease manning, in some cases to just 22 seafarers on 
a very large crude carrier (VLCC). There are two sides to 
the technological advances. Improvements in ship design 
and navigation aids have reduced the frequency and 
severity of shipping incidents. In turn, the reduction of 
failures in technology has revealed the underlying level of 
influence of human error in accident causation 
(Catherine, 2006).  
The fact that human factors contribute to accidents is 
generally accepted, but there is no consensus on the 
importance of this factor. Suggestions regarding the 
proportion of marine accidents caused by human errors 
vary from 50 to 90% of the total (Kletz, 1991). The main 
causes of accidents is shown in Figure 1 where first 60% 
of the total number of claims recorded that human error 
was the direct cause and further 30% human error is from 
indirect contributory cause. 
Human factors are based on the acknowledgement that 
human characteristics and behaviors are intrinsically 
linked with the functioning of the technology, people, 
design, building, maintains area and operation. The 
human-technology relationship works in both directions. 
Not only do humans impact the functioning of our techno-
logy, but technology can also influence human decisions 
and actions. Since human factors is triggered by human 
errors, which are the main source of risk in maritime 
activities, it seems interesting to develop methodologies 
that allow evaluating quantitatively and qualitatively the 
real incidence of several human factors over maritime 
accidents happening with the aim of taking human factors 
into account in properly developed risk management 
plans (de la Campa Portela, 2005). 
Human reliability assessment required system based 
approach analysis that makes it easy to determine 
human factors risk levels through statistical analysis of 
maritime accidents. The risk of disasters cannot be 
eliminated, but risks can be reduced by establishing 
better safety criteria prior to an accident. This paper 
present the finding of human reliability analysis that can 
reduce the probability risk in ship navigation in coastal 
area by considering the relationship between the human 
factors and technologies, the cause of the accident from 
technological influence to human error and deduce 
solution from the analysis (Ayyub, 2002).  
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
In this study, few qualitative and quantitative approach methods 
were used to analyze the relationship between human factors and 
technologies following the analysis of the causes of  accidents  from  
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Figure 1. Main causes of accidents (Marine department, Malaysia, 2009). 
 
 
 
technological influence to associated human error and in deducing 
the solution from the analysis. The methods used include appli-
cation of the checklists (Failure Modes and FMEA, FTA) and ETA. 
 
 
Checklists 
 
This is a qualitative approach to ensure that the organizations are 
complying with standard practices. The checklists can be used as a 
preparation for a port call to avoid unnecessary problems and 
delays. The checklists may be included in the International Safety 
Management (ISM) procedures as documentation to checks for 
maintenance etc. The list can be filled in manually or printout or 
electronically. The list is qualitatively assessed in correlation 
between human and technology, and management for operation of 
ships. Checklist is observed to capture the gaps in the system. 
 
 
FMEA 
 
FMEA is a systematic tool for identifying the effects or conse-
quences of a potential product or process failure; and the methods 
to eliminate or reduce the chance of a failure of occurring. It 
involves identification of the process functions that has been clearly 
articulated. It requires preparation of a failure mode analysis and 
preparation of worksheets by using reliability analysis software, like 
Relex or isograph. And next, is identification of the failure modes 
and the description of the effects of these failure modes. This is 
followed by establishment of a numerical ranking for the severity of 
the effect in order to identify the cause of each failure mode. The 
occurrence factor and the likelihood of detection are determined. 
The risk priority numbers (RPN) is determined by a product of the 
numerical values of severity, occurrence and detection ratings:  
 
RPN = (Severity) x (Probability) x (Detection) 
 
Finally, recommendation of action(s) to address potential failures 
that have a high RPN can be made. 
 
 
FTA 
 
Fault tree analysis is generally performed graphically using a logical 
structure of AND and OR gates. There should be only one top 
event, and all risk contributing factors must tree down from it. Actual 
number of failure probabilities, area assigned to the contributing 
factor. Traditionally, it is usually assumed that the basic events 
within a fault tree are independent of each other and could be 
represented in terms of probabilistic numbers. There are five steps 
involved for the basic Relex FTA, which are to define the undesired 
event to study. Next, is obtain an understanding of the system. Next  
is to only construct the fault tree and evaluate it. Lastly, controls for 
the hazards are identified.  
 
 
ETA 
 
Event tree analysis is based on discrete binary logic, in which an 
event is in either ON or OFF state which indicate that failure did not 
happen, failure happened or a component of it has not failed. It is 
valuable in analyzing the consequences arising from a failure or 
undesired event. An event tree begins with an initiating event of 
interest. The consequences of the event are followed through a 
series of possible paths. Each path is assigned a probability of 
occurrence and the probability of the various possible outcomes 
can be calculated from them.    
 
 
Technique of human error probability (THERP)  
 
Accident data 
 
Casualty statistics: The total losses of all ships and boats during 
the years 2000 to 2009 are 289 in number, according to the 
Malaysian Marine Department data that reported to Port Klang’s 
Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) for annual casualty 
statistics in Peninsular Malaysia, which include coastal areas of 
Peninsular Malaysia and the Straits of Malacca. Total losses in 
number during the years of 2000 to 2009 are presented in Figure 3 
and 4 respectively. Sinking or foundering accounts for total losses 
of almost 50% of accident compared to collision which accounts for 
total losses amounting to only 26.30 % as shown in Figure 2.    
Figure 3 and 4 shows that the total accident of ships and boats in 
Malaysia coastal areas and the Straits of Malacca from year 2000 
till year 2009 respectively. From Figure 3, analysis shows that the 
highest ranking of accident which only occurred in average of eight 
cases at the Malaysia coastal areas in ten years. From 2000 until 
2009, a total of 215 accidents including sinking or foundering, 
collision, fire or explosion and grounding occurred in the Straits of 
Malacca with an average of 30 accidents per year. About 353 
vessels of all types passes through the Straits of Malacca each 
year and 35% of them are oil tankers and this has potential to 
increase the discharges of oil in the sea including ballast water, oil, 
sewage and others solid wastes. As shown from the bar chart, the 
probability of an accident to occur at the Straits of Malacca is high if 
compared to the Malaysia coastal areas. This is because Malacca 
Straits is a golden heritage of the littoral states such as Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia. It is not only rich in marine resources but 
is also one of the oldest and busiest shipping lanes in the world. 
As the years come by, from year 2004 till 2009, there were 
reducing numbers in maritime casualties which in average of ten 
accidents per year. In  accordance  with  the  International  Maritime 
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Figure 2. Total losses of ships in number during the Years 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Total of accident of ships and boats at Malaysia coastal areas from Years 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
 
Organization’s (IMO) Rules for vessels navigating through the Straits 
of Malacca, an under keel clearance of 3.5 m is required for 
shipping safety of navigation and reduction in the risk for an 
accident to occur. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Qualitative risk assessment and analysis method 
 
Checklists 
 
Prior to arrival and departure of vessel in port, checks on 
operation procedure should be carried out after long 
ocean passages and before entering restricted coastal 
areas. The incident command system (ICS) emergency 
checklist for collision is carried out, actions include switch 
the VHF to Chanel 16, check for the watch alarm system 
etc. In the navigational watch checklist, the primary duties 
of the Officer of the Watch (OOW) are watch keeping, 
navigation and GMDSS radio watch keeping complying 
all times with the COLREGS and STCW95. The Officer of 
the Watch is not allowed to leave the bridge until properly 
relieved. While in the sole lookout checklist, a sole look-
out is allowed only during day light according to the 
STCW code. The qualitative exercise is matched closely 
with guideline given by reference IMO (2002) and 
FortLand (2004).  
The master, before allowing the exercise, has to 
carefully assess the situation and ensure that it is safe to 
operate with a sole lookout of the state of weather, 
visibility and traffic density. In addition, basically radar 
also should be kept running and fully operational at all 
times. The log books checklist which includes a correct 
record of the movements and activities of the vessel 
should be kept in the appropriate log book during the 
watch. Instructions for the completion of log books should 
be strictly observed as per respective national regulations 
and rules. Navigational and radio equipment has to be 
checked periodically to ensure satisfactory and safe 
operation.  
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Figure 4. Total of accident of ships and boats at Malacca straits from Years 2000 to 2009 (Source: Malaysian Marine 
Department). 
 
 
 
Quantitative risk assessment and analysis method 
 
Failure modes and FMEA 
 
Analysis is carried out by using Relex FMEA. The 
following is the Relex FMEA worksheet (Figure 5) based 
on the process: water leaking into vessel. The potential 
failure modes for the sinking or foundering process 
includes the failure system of bilge alarm, inadequate of 
watertight  bulkhead,  failure  of  seawater  pipe  work 
and the perforation of hull plating. One of the causes to 
the failure of the bilge alarm system is the electrical 
failure where the terminal connector block is not suitable 
for  used and the screw terminals provide an opportunity 
for corrosion resulting in the connection failing. Other 
than that, as previously mentioned, human factor play a 
main role, it is also possible that a bilge level alarm that 
activates every time, vessel motion will be ignored or 
turned off.  
As a result, the RPN is established as well. The graph 
of FMEA risk level (Figure 6) is to view a graph of the 
failure modes with the highest RPN values. In the graph 
that is obtained, the highest RPN is 252 for seawater pipe 
work failure. The pipe failure which led to the flooding 
was caused by simple sea water corrosion. Piping 
failures are so far from the main cause of all fishing 
vessel flooding and foundering, where the cause has 
been identified. While for the potential failure modes like 
bilge alarm system failure and perforation of hull plating 
has RPN, 216 and 192 respectively. Steel hull plating 
failures occur frequently. Failure mode of lack of 
watertight bulkhead has its RPN at 168 where the 
severity ranks at 7 and occurrence ranking at 6. To have 
a watertight machinery compartment, the maintenance 
and inspection of the watertight integrity must be 
adequate. The outcome of risk outcome is measure using 
guideline provided by reference (USCG, 2006). 
FTA 
 
From accident data, it has been identified that sinking or 
foundering accident has the highest ranking among the 
other accidents. Thus, it means that a systematic 
approach must be undertaken to identify all possible 
causes and their consequences, so that risk can be 
reduced to a minimum level through appropriate safety 
measures. By using the fault tree symbols, a simple fault 
tree for a top event, water leaking into vessel, is shown in 
Figure 7. The occurrence probability of the top event of a 
fault tree can be calculated when the probabilities of the 
occurrence of basic fault events are known. This can only 
be obtained by first calculating the occurrence probability 
of the resultant (that is, output) fault events of 
intermediate by using lower logic gates such as AND and 
OR.  
Thus, the probability of occurrence of the number of 
AND gate output fault event is expressed by: 
  
    (1) 
 
Where, , is the probability of occurrence of the 
AND gate output fault event ; , is the number of AND 
gate input fault events; , is the occurrence 
probability of AND gate input fault event ; for  = 1, 2, 3, 
….,  .  
Similarly, the probability of occurrence of the OR gate 
output fault event is given by: 
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Figure 5. A Relex FMEA worksheet which based on the process: water leaking into vessel 
 
 
Figure 5. A Relex FMEA worksheet which based n the proc ss: water leaking into vessel. 
 
 
 
Where, , is the probability of occurrence of the OR 
gate output fault event ; k, is the number of OR gate 
input fault events; , is the occurrence probability of 
OR gate input fault tree event ; for  = 1, 2, 3, …., k. 
By substituting the given probabilities and calculated 
values of the top event: Water leaking into vessel into the 
equations. Thus, the probability of occurrence of the top 
event: water leaking into vessel is 0.1759.  
In this regard, better training and procedures can help 
to promote better communications and coordination on 
and between vessels. Poor equipment design was a 
causal factor in one-third of major marine casualties. A 
proper consideration by equipment designers to factors 
such as how a given piece of equipment will support the 
mariner’s tasks and how it can be integrate into the entire 
equipment “suite” used by the mariner can be a very 
helpful step. The issue of “inexperience, lack of knowledge 
and training” is concerned with poor understanding of 
mariners of how automation works or under what 
conditions it was designed to work effectively. 
Consequently, mariners sometimes commit errors in 
using the equipment. Poor inspection and maintenance is 
another important issue because poor maintenance of 
navigational equipments can lead to dangerous work 
environments and lack of backup systems that need to 
carry out emergency repairs.  
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Figure 6. A FMEA risk level based on the process: water leaking into vessel. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.  A fault tree diagram for the top event: water leaking into vessel. 
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Figure 8. A fault tree diagram for the top event: collision. 
 
 
 
After the first top event, fault tree analysis is repeated 
for the second top event: collision. Fault tree for a top 
event analysis by RELEX Reliability software, collision,  is 
shown in Figure 8. Also by substituting with manual 
calculation the given probabilities and calculated values 
of the top event: collision  into  the  equations.  Thus,  the  
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Figure 9. Event tree analysis for collision. 
 
 
 
probability of occurrence of the top event: collision is 
0.1121 (ETA, 2001).  
 
 
ETA 
 
The goal of ETA is to determine the probability of all the 
possible outcomes resulting from the occurrence of an IE. 
By analyzing all possible outcomes, it is possible to 
determine the percentage of outcomes that lead to the 
desired result and the percentage of outcomes that lead 
to the undesired result. Each safety design method is 
evaluated for the contributing event: 
 
(a) Operates successfully  
(b) Fails to operate  
 
Each success/failure event is assigned a probability of 
occurrence, and the final outcome probability is the 
product of the event probabilities along a particular path. 
When computing the success/fail probability for each 
contributing PE, the PE states must always be sum to 
1.0, based on the reliability formula that: 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are errors (both human and technology) common 
to accidents in waterways. Employing methods through 
which these can be moderated and reduced could poten-
tially enhance shipping safety. The practical application of 
human reliability analysis is clear. It requires obtaining 
the cause parameters, both direct and indirect 
parameters, from the studied factor. The parameters that 
help to better understand the root of the presence of such 
a factor, and help to take punctual, specific and direct 
corrective actions to try to minimize the accident risk. The 
use of systemic HRA with right data, assessment and 
analysis can be is one mainstay to accident reduce, 
control and prevent maritime accident and sub sequential 
improvement of maritime safety. Nowadays, it has 
becomes a very important tool to identify the problems 
related to human factor. Technological and engineering 
improvements in the marine sector have shown in some 
cases, to increase the risk of an accident occurring due to 
human factors. The human factor accidents are mostly 
caused by lack of skill or knowledge, or other risk 
compensation.  
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